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Te Child and Dependent Care 
Credit (CDCC), a tax credit based 
on income and child care expenses, 
subsidizes child care costs for working 
families. Te federal CDCC is available 
to households with children younger 
than 13 in which all parents have 
positive annual earnings. While many 
families meet these criteria, from its 
introduction in 1976 through 2020, 
the CDCC was nonrefundable, so 
only families with positive tax liability 
afer other deductions benefted. Tis 
generally precluded very-low-income 
families from receiving CDCC benefts, 
and many policymakers advocated 
making the credit refundable. In 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the American Rescue Plan Act of 
2021 made the CDCC refundable and 
increased its generosity during tax 
year 2021 only. I estimate how CDCC 
eligibility, benefts, and marginal tax 
rates would change for diferent groups 
if the credit were made permanently
refundable. 
Using data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation, 
which documents income, 
demographics, and child care expenses 
of U.S. households, I fnd that making 
the CDCC permanently refundable 
would lead to relatively large increases 
in eligibility among single-parent, 
Black, and Hispanic households, 
which are all less likely to qualify for 
the nonrefundable credit. Specifcally, 
some 3 percent of Black households, 2 
percent of Hispanic households, and 
1 percent of white households would 
gain eligibility, all else equal. About 
5 percent of single parents would 
gain eligibility and receive on average 
over $1,000 in benefts annually. Tis 
increase is substantial, constituting 
18 percent of existing child care 
spending and 10 percent of adjusted 
gross income (AGI). Nevertheless, 
refundability would generate small 
increases in marginal tax rates for some 
moderate-income taxpayers. Making 
the CDCC permanently refundable 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC) subsidizes child care costs for work-
ing families.
n In 2021, the CDCC was made temporarily refundable, so even families with no 
positive tax liability after other deductions could benefit.
n If refundability were made permanent, around 5 percent of single parents would 
gain eligibility and receive on average over $1,000 per year in benefits.
n Permanent refundability would also lead to large increases in eligibility among 
Black and Hispanic households.
n Some moderate-income taxpayers would experience small increases in marginal 
tax rates.
would increase government spending 
each year by about $800 million, or 21 
percent of CDCC spending during the 
late 2010s. 
How Does the CDCC Work? 
Congress implemented the CDCC 
in 1976 and expanded it in 1981 and 
2001. Te latter expansion took efect 
in 2003, and between 2003 and 2020, 
households were able to claim up to 
$3,000 worth of child care expenses 
per year for each of up to two children 
younger than 13. Such households 
could receive a tax credit worth up to 
If the CDCC were made
permanently refundable,
low-income taxpayers would
receive larger benefts. 
35 percent of those expenses, up to 
$1,050 per child. Beginning at $15,000 
in AGI, the beneft rate decreased by 
1 percentage point for each additional 
$2,000 until it remained at 20 percent 
for those with $43,000 or more in AGI, 
who could receive up to $600 per child 
in benefts. Te CDCC, however, was 
nonrefundable, so taxpayers without 
positive tax liability were ineligible. 
Moreover, CDCC claimants must 
work to qualify for benefts, including 
both spouses among married taxpayers 
fling jointly. Additionally, if either 
spouse’s earnings are less than child 
care expenditures, the CDCC is capped 
by the pay of the lower-earning spouse. 
Almost any child care expenditures 
are eligible for the credit, except care 
provided by a noncustodial parent, 
but to claim the credit, taxpayers 
must list their earnings, child care 
expenditures, and child care providers’ 
tax identifcation or Social Security 
numbers. 
How Would Permanent Refundability 
Afect CDCC Eligibility and Benefts? 
Nonrefundability generates a 
diference between statutory and 
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actual benefts received. In Figure 
1, I compare maximum efective 
CDCC benefts with and without 
refundability as of 2020.1 Taxpayers’ 
incomes must exceed the tax fling 
threshold of $18,650 to be eligible for 
nonrefundable benefts. For taxpayers 
with incomes above this threshold, 
nonrefundable benefts (red lines) 
increase with income before reaching 
peaks of about $860 at $27,600 in 
AGI for households with one eligible 
child and $1,530 at $34,100 in AGI for 
households with two or more eligible 
children. Benefts then decrease until 
they plateau at $600 per child for 
taxpayers with $43,000 or more in 
income. 
Figure 1 also shows that if the 
CDCC were made permanently 
refundable (blue lines), low-income 
taxpayers would receive larger benefts. 
For very-low-income taxpayers, 
refundable benefts increase as income 
increases and then hold steady at 
$1,050 per child at incomes up to 
$15,000. For taxpayers with AGI 
above $15,000, refundable benefts 
steadily fall as income increases until 
they converge with nonrefundable 
benefts. Hence, making the CDCC 
permanently refundable would 
increase generosity among low-income 
taxpayers without afecting benefts for 
those with higher incomes. 
How Would Permanent Refundability 
Afect Work Decisions? 
As a subsidy for child care, 
CDCC benefts encourage child care 
spending and efectively increase 
wages net of child care costs. Since all 
parents must work to receive benefts, 
increases in benefts promote labor 
force participation. However, the 
CDCC generates complex work hours 
incentives. To examine how making the 
CDCC permanently refundable would 
afect work hours, I compare marginal 
tax rates with respect to income—the 
taxes that parents would owe on an 
additional dollar of income—with 







Federal AGI ($000s) 
NOTE: The fgure shows expected federal CDCC benefts for households with one (dashed line) or two or more 
(solid line) eligible children as of 2020. The maximum credit with refundability is shown in blue and without 
refundability is shown in red. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using federal tax forms. 
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and without refundability. When 
marginal tax rates increase, the value 
of an additional dollar of earnings 
falls, which discourages parents from 
working more. 
Figure 2 displays these marginal 
tax rates for households with the 
maximum qualifying child care 
expenditures as of 2020.2 Panel A, 
which shows marginal tax rates for 
single parents with one eligible child, 
indicates that making the CDCC 
permanently refundable would 
decrease marginal tax rates by 35 
percentage points for those with less 
than $3,000 in AGI. (Marginal tax 
rates are already negative in this range, 
implying that an additional dollar of 
earnings is worth more than a dollar 
because of the credit.) Refundability 
would not afect marginal tax rates 
for single parents between incomes 
of $3,000 and $15,000, but it would 
increase rates by 1.5 percentage points 
between incomes of $15,000 and 
$25,000 and by 11.5 percentage points 
between incomes of $25,000 and 
$33,000. 
Marginal tax rates for married 
parents with two eligible children, 
depicted in Panel B of Figure 2, exhibit 
a similar pattern. Tus, a permanently 
refundable CDCC would reduce 
marginal tax rates for households 
with very low incomes, incentivizing 
increases in their work hours, but 
it would increase marginal tax rates 
for households with low to moderate 
incomes, discouraging their work 
hours. 
How Would Permanent Refundability 
Afect Diferent Families? 
As refundability has diferent 
impacts on tax rates across the 
income distribution, which 
households would likely beneft from 
a permanently refundable CDCC? 
To answer the question, I simulate 
impacts of refundability, drawing 
on the 2018 Survey of Income and 
Program Participation for taxpayer 
characteristics and child care spending 
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among households with children 
younger than 13. Te data allow me 
to estimate CDCC eligibility rates by 
family structure and race and observe 
how permanent refundability would 
afect CDCC benefts and marginal 
tax rates across households that face 
diferent child care and labor supply 
incentives. 
I fnd that 15 percent of single 
parents and 19 percent of married 
parents are eligible for nonrefundable 
CDCC benefts. About 5 percent of 
single parents have incomes too low to 
qualify for the nonrefundable benefts 
but would become eligible if the credit 
were made permanently refundable. 
Another 56 percent of single parents 
would gain eligibility if refundability 
led them to pay for child care. Te 
remaining 25 percent of single parents 
low to qualify for the nonrefundable 
CDCC but would become eligible if 
refundability led them to pay for child 
care. Tese results suggest permanent 
CDCC refundability would decrease 
eligibility gaps between whites and 
underrepresented groups. 
Permanent refundability would also 
change beneft amounts for diferent 
families. Among single parents who 
work and already pay for child care, 
23 percent are ineligible for the 
nonrefundable CDCC, another 23 
percent fall in the phase-in region of 
the CDCC, where benefts increase as 
income rises, and the remaining 54 
percent fall in the phase-out/plateau 
region of the credit, where benefts 
decrease or remain constant as income 
rises. Households in the ineligible and 
phase-in regions on average spend 
about $6,000 and $11,000 per year, 
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do not work and have incomes too 
low to qualify for the nonrefundable 
CDCC. Among married parents, 
10 percent have incomes too low to 
qualify for the nonrefundable CDCC, 




pay for child care and therefore would 
remain ineligible under a refundable -60 
credit. Most married parents are 
ineligible for the CDCC because they 
do not pay for child care or one of the -80 
parents does not work. 
CDCC eligibility rates also vary 60% 
by parents’ race and ethnicity. Black 
and Hispanic households, which tend 40% 
to have lower incomes, are less likely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Federal AGI ($000s) 
Nonrefundable CDCC Refundable CDCC 
NOTE: The fgure shows marginal tax rates with respect to AGI under the federal CDCC, Child Tax Credit, Earned 
Income Tax Credit, and federal individual income tax schedule as of 2020, assuming the CDCC is nonrefundable 
or refundable. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using TAXSIM and federal tax forms. 
20% than white households to be eligible for 
the nonrefundable CDCC. Whereas 
0%21 percent of white households are 
eligible, only 17 percent of Black 
-20 households and 13 percent of Hispanic 
households are eligible. Making the 
-40 CDCC permanently refundable 
would increase eligibility by about 
3 percentage points among Black -60 
households, by about 2 percentage 
points among Hispanic households, -80 
and by about 1 percentage point among 
white households. Another 14 percent 
of Black households, 8 percent of 
Hispanic households, and 7 percent 
of white households have incomes too 
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respectively, on child care. If the CDCC 
were made permanently refundable, 
average annual benefts would increase 
from $0 to $1,037 in the ineligible 
region and from $617 to $1,249 in the 
phase-in region. Tese increases are 
substantial: in the ineligible region, 
the increase constitutes 18 percent of 
existing child care spending and 10 
percent of AGI. In the phase-in region, 
it constitutes 6 percent of child care 
spending and 3 percent of AGI. 
Tese beneft increases also afect 
marginal tax rates. In the ineligible 
region, the average marginal tax rate 
on an additional dollar of income 
would fall by 5 percentage points under 
refundability, while in the phase-in 
and phase-out/plateau regions it would 
rise by about 2 percentage points. 
However, the benefts also subsidize 
the cost of child care, efectively 
making it cheaper. For households 
in the ineligible region, the efective 
(postsubsidy) cost of an additional 
dollar of child care spending decreases 
by 16 percent. In the phase-in and 
phase-out/plateau regions, the cost 
decreases by 9 and 4 cents on the 
dollar, respectively. Tus, moderate-
income households have slightly higher 
marginal tax rates on their incomes 
ofset by cheaper child care costs, with 
the latter possibly mitigating work 
disincentives caused by the former. 
How Would Permanent Refundability 
Afect Government Spending? 
Finally, CDCC beneft increases 
under refundability would increase 
government spending. If all households 
with beneft increases were to claim 
the CDCC, making it permanently 
refundable would increase government 
spending annually by about $800 
million, or about 22 percent of total 
CDCC spending in the late 2010s. 
Notes 
1. I assume single taxpayers fle as head-of-
household, married taxpayers fle jointly, 
and all income comes from earnings among 
very-low-income taxpayers. 
2. I assume households do not have older 
children, all income comes from earnings, 
and married parents have equal earnings, 
though results are similar for married 
parents with unequal earnings. 
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/ 
up_workingpapers/344. 
Gabrielle Pepin is a postdoctoral researcher at the
Upjohn Institute. 
Inviting Submissions for the 2021 Dissertation Award 
Te W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research invites 
submissions for its 27th annual prize 
for the best PhD dissertation on 
employment-related issues. 
A frst prize of $2,500 is being 
ofered. Up to two honorable mention 
awards of $1,000 may also be given. 
Te Institute supports and conducts 
policy-relevant research on issues 
related to employment, unemployment, 
and social insurance programs. Te 
dissertation award furthers this 
mission. Te dissertation may come 
from any academic discipline, but it 
must have a substantial policy focus. 
Dissertations will be evaluated by a 
panel of economists using the following 
criteria: 
• Policy relevance 
• Technical quality of the research 
• Presentation 
Any person whose dissertation has 
been accepted during the 24-month 
period from July 1, 2019 to June 30, 
2021 is eligible for the 2021 prize.  
Te deadline for submission is July 
5, 2021. Applicants must upload a 10-
page summary of the dissertation, CV, 
and a letter of endorsement from their 
dissertation advisor at: https://www 
.upjohn.org/form/dissertation-award. 
Applicants are advised that they will 
need to supply a copy of their entire 
dissertation if they are selected as a 
fnalist, and they may apply for the 
award only once. 
Additional information may 
be obtained by contacting us at 
communications@upjohn.org. 
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